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Abstract 
The main purpose of the study is to examine the relationship between audit firm tenure and auditor reporting quality in 
Malaysia. This study employs well-established going concern model of logistic regression. Our findings show that audit 
firm tenure is positively significant relationship with auditor reporting quality. Future research should consider other 
importance variables that may affect the auditor reporting quality such as non-audit services, and audit partner tenure. 
However, in sum, this study is in line with the recent decision by the regulators not to regulate a mandatory audit firm 
rotation in Malaysia. This study provides a very importance implication and as a cornerstone to the regulators and 
policy makers in a developing country as the issue continues to be strong interest among them in improving the auditor 
independence.    
Keywords: Audit firm tenure, Auditor reporting quality, Malaysia
1. Introduction
In the past few years, auditors had been blamed due to their role in the mega corporate scandals such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, ImClone Systems and Tyco International. The criticism had raised lots of questions 
regarding auditors’ independence. Besides, such criticism was leveled against auditors because they audit their clients 
for a long time and subsequently concentrated more on non-audit services rather than audit.  For example in the case of 
Enron, Andersen was the auditor since Enron was set up until collapsed. Therefore, there has been a call for sweeping 
changes in the auditing profession to ensure independence and therefore improve their audit quality (“Auditing 
Profession”, 2002).  
The issue of an audit firm compromise their independence if they audit their client for a long time has been a subject of 
debate in the United States, which can be traced back at least 50 years ago (Mautz & Sharaf, 1961). Later, the issue 
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seems to be pertinent international recurring debate among regulators, auditors and academicians (Shockley, 1981; 
Arrunada & Paz-Ares, 1997; Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002; Johnson, Khurana & Reynolds, 2002). Such long-term 
relationships could, in reality or be perceived to, make the audit firms too committed or beholden to the companies, 
thereby undermining its independence, compromising its objectivity, and reducing its effectiveness (“Auditing 
Profession”, 2002). Therefore, several countries in European Union such as Italy and Spain have required the 
mandatory audit firm rotation (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002).   
However, even in such a mandatory auditor rotation regime, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that audit quality is 
improved by this means. For example, the scandal involves a company namely Parmalat in Italy complied with a law 
that requires companies to change their auditors every nine years. The discovery of losses amounting to RM41.8 billion 
in Parmalat has provoked outrage across continent of Europe and proves that the law of auditor rotation still does not 
help to improve audit quality. (“Scandal”, 2003). 
Following the corporate scandals in the United States, the regulators in Malaysia such as the Malaysia Securities 
Commission (SC) and the Bursa Malaysia became more concerned with the mandatory audit firms rotation. In view of 
the importance of the issue in question, the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) and the Malaysia Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), who are the accounting governing bodies in Malaysia, agreed to establish an 
MIA/MACPA joint Taskforce on Auditor Independence in May 2002. Both institutes agreed that the overall 
disadvantages of mandatory rotation of audit firms, including exorbitant costs, disruption and loss of accumulative 
knowledge, and a restriction on the freedom of companies to choose their own auditors, outweigh the benefits that may 
be derived from such rotation of audit firms. (Malaysian Institute of Accountants, 2002) 
However, the MIA suggested a more lenient way to regulate auditor independence. A call of mandatory auditor rotation 
involve only audit partner rotation but not in the case of the audit firm as a whole. The MIA recommended that there 
should be a mandatory rotation of the audit partners responsible for the audit of listed companies after a period of not 
more than five years. Furthermore, the audit partner rotating after such period should not resume the role of audit 
engagement partner for the audit client until two years have elapsed. Prior to this pronouncement, in 1999, the MIA 
under its former president, Datuk Hanifah Noordin, called for a mandatory rotation of external auditors in every three or 
five years. (“MIA”, 1999).  
There is very limited empirical evidence regarding the long audit firm tenure impairs auditor independence by 
compromising auditor reporting quality in developing countries such as Malaysia. Most of the studies were done in 
developed countries. Furthermore, a strong interest of debate among regulators in the developed countries caused the 
regulators and policy makers in developing countries to review back their audit legislation.  However, it is still not 
clear whether the issue arise in such developing countries. Besides, recent studies in the developed countries do not 
support the contention that there should be a mandatory audit firm rotation (Johnson et al., 2002; Geiger & 
Raghunandan, 2002; Myers, Myers & Omer, 2003; Carcello & Nagy, 2004; Ghosh & Moon, 2005). Therefore, the 
purpose of the study is to examine the effect of auditor-client relationship, namely audit firm tenure on auditor reporting 
quality, proxies by going concern opinion in Malaysia environment. Thus, this study tries to support whether the 
suggestion of auditor rotation can be used in the current situation in Malaysia using Malaysian companies listed on the 
Bursa Malaysia (Main Board and Second Board).  
Our sample is companies listed in the Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, KLSE). 
Prior to 1998, the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) did not adopt the International Auditing Guideline (IAG) 
23 on assessment of going concern assumption. Later, in 1998, the MIA adopted ISA 570 Going Concern in which 
issued by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). Then the standard revised in the year of 2000 and 
became operative from January 2002. Among significant changes between IAG 23 and ISA 570 include provision to 
assess going concern assumption in every audit engagement and additional prescription to guide practitioners in 
detecting going concern problem. 
In sum, our result shows that a positive relationship between audit firm tenure and auditor reporting quality is in line 
with the recent decision by Malaysian regulators not to regulate mandatory audit firm rotation in public listed 
companies. Our results are also consistent with prior studies based in developed countries (Geiger & Raghunandan, 
2002) and add to the growing body of literature on mandatory audit firm rotation. The results from this study are useful 
for the regulators as a feedback to improve the auditor independence in Malaysia.  The regulators must emphasize the 
impact of auditor tenure to the audit quality especially if there is a negative relationship between auditor tenure and 
audit quality. If this happens, it can be said that long time auditors are deemed to impair their independence when 
auditing their clients.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the arguments supporting and opposing 
long audit firm tenure and develop the hypothesis. Methodology for this research is discussed in section 3 whereas in 
section 4, we discuses our data and findings and finally our conclusions are presented in final section of the paper. 
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2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Auditor reporting quality is a basic ingredient to enhance the credibility of financial statements to those interested 
parties. However, this could not been seen if the auditor is not independence. Without independence, the process of 
auditing can be argued to the extend that the auditor would give bias opinion to their clients. One of the factors that 
would adversely influence auditor independence in giving their opinion is a close relationship between auditor and 
clients, namely long audit tenure. For example, Deis and Giroux (1992) found that the longer the auditors audit their 
clients the larger that lead to such close relationship between the audit firms and clients and consequently decrease audit 
quality.    
Prior studies have documented two viewpoints of the effect of audit tenure on the credibility of financial statements; 
regulators view and economic view (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). In the point of regulatory view, long association 
between a client and an audit firm may lead to impair their independence (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). For example, 
in the United States, the Metcalf Committee report argued that long association between a corporation and an 
accounting firm may lead to such close identification of the accounting firm with the interests of its client’s 
management that truly independent action by the accounting firm becomes difficult. Therefore, the report suggested a 
mandatory auditor rotation as a way for the accounting profession to bolster their independence from clients (Geiger & 
Raghunandan, 2002). Furthermore, if we go back to 50 years ago, Mautz and Sharaf (1961) noted that long association 
with the same client can lead to the auditor independence problems due to the fact that a slow, gradual and honest 
disinterestedness would be the greatest factors that impaired auditor independence. Therefore, a mandatory auditor 
rotation regime would improve audit quality by reducing client’s ability to adversely influence the auditor judgments 
(Brody & Moscove, 1998) and minimize the auditor independence threats. (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002)  
Deis and Giroux (1992); O’Keefe, Simunic and Stein (1994); and Raghunandan, Lewis and Evans (1994) found that the 
long auditor tenure would decrease audit quality. Similarly, Vanstraelen (2000) found negatively relationship between 
auditor tenure and opinion and then again provide support for a mandatory audit firm rotation. Also, evidence shows 
that the shorter auditor tenure the more likely the clients receive a disclaimer going concern opinion (Anandarajan, La 
Salle & Anandarajan, 2001). In an experimental setting, Dopuch, King, and Schwartz (2001) found the auditors are less 
likely to impose a biased report if rotation is required, but it also increases the magnitude of investment to improve 
financial reporting quality. Furthermore, in Malaysia, Teoh and Lim (1996) found that retention of auditors for over five 
years would influence and impair audit independence. The Malaysian perceived audit firm rotation would improve 
auditor independence. (Teoh & Lim, 1996)  
However, more recently, in the United States, the General Accounting Office (GAO) states, “mandatory audit firm 
rotation may not be the most efficient way to strengthen auditor independence” (GAO 2003, Highlights). Yet, the GAO 
leaves a flexibility to revisit the mandatory audit firm rotation if the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s requirements do not lead to 
improved audit quality (GAO 2003, 5). Moreover, other regulators report in the United States, suggest that a voluntary 
basis for the clients to change their auditors for a specific of time (New York Stock Exchange, 2003, 11; Commission 
on Public Trust and Private Enterprise, 2003, 33; and TIAA-CREF, 2004, 9). Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the auditor 
independence is regulated through audit partner rotation but not for the case of audit firm rotation. The lead audit or 
coordinating partner and the reviewing partner must be rotated in every 5 years. Similarly, in Malaysia, the MIA only 
regulated all public listed companies’ lead audit partner to be rotated every 5 years.   
In the second viewpoint, maintaining the same audit firm for a long period is considered more economic to the clients 
due to high start up cost when the clients rotate the auditors. According to Geiger and Raghunandan (2002), audit firms 
tend to reduce their audit fees in the early year of engagement to attract clients. The practice of low-balling requires 
audit firm to seek for longer audit engagement with their clients so that they could recover back their loss in the early 
year. Long association between audit firm and its client does not really impair auditor independence. Auditor’s 
independence was impaired only in the early year of audit engagement and not for the whole audit engagement. (Geiger 
& Raghunandan, 2002) 
Similarly, Stice (1991) found the relationship between auditor tenure and a lawsuit against the auditor. In the study, he 
found that auditor tenure was shorter for those audit engagements that resulted in a lawsuit against the auditor. This 
happened in the case of control sample that matched only on time period. However, it is not true when compared to an 
industry pair-matched control sample.   
De Angelo (1981) also mentioned that the quality of auditors divided to two parts. First is to detect anything misleading 
in financial statements of the client and secondly is to report the misleading information. The first quality is regarding 
the competence and skills of the auditors to detect any fraud while the second one is related to the auditors’ 
independence. In the case of long time auditor, it is argued that the auditor’s independence will be reduced because the 
auditor feels comfortable with the clients whether in term of revenue and also their expertise on the clients’ system. 
Subsequently they will not report any misleading information to ensure there is no any change of auditors. In that case, 
an unqualified report (clean report) will be issued. 
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The studies on auditor tenure could not be separated from the auditor switching studies. Many studies found that 
financially distressed firms were more likely to switch auditors than non distressed companies due to the reason that 
these types of companies need to hire a new quality of auditor compared to the previous one (Krishnan, 1994; Krishnan 
& Stephens, 1995).  Sinason, Jones, and Shelton (2001) found that auditor tenure is longer for clients who received 
unqualified or unqualified-modified opinions. Interestingly, in Malaysia, Ismail (1998) found such behavior is less 
apparent using data from 1975-1995. In one extreme case, the auditor was not even replaced after issuing five 
consecutive times of a disclaimer opinion to a client. But, the results statistically equivalent, meaning that no evidence 
exists to indicate that auditor tenure is longer for clients with unqualified opinions.    
Similarly, Krishnan (1994); Krishnan & Stephens (1995) found that switching companies were no more likely to have 
their modified report removed than were similar companies that did not switch auditors. Therefore, it is argued that if 
the financially distressed firms still maintain the same auditors and by the same time, if an unqualified report is issued, 
it may be perceived that the auditors’ independence is impaired.   
It is often argued that mandatory audit firm rotation is one of the solutions to solve auditor’s cozy relationship with their 
clients. Auditor firm rotation supporters argue that its benefits stem from greater audit independence, which in turn 
improves audit quality. However, the cost of imposing mandatory audit firm rotation would lead to higher start-up cost, 
impedes learning curve, as well as the failures to attract new-blood to the accounting profession and lower investment 
from the audit firms to enhance knowledge and expertise in certain industries (Petty & Cuganesan, 1996). In the case of 
Malaysia where foreign direct investment is still a major economic contributor, the country looks less attractive than its 
neighboring counterparts especially Singapore since the appointment of auditors is usually for the company affairs and 
not for regulators as stated under Section 9 (6) of the Malaysian Companies Act 1965. For example, the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS) has requisitioned all banks incorporated in Singapore to change their audit firms every 
five years under a new ruling. The new audit requirement is one of a series of control measures on corporate governance 
introduced by the Singapore authorities (“Bank”, 2002). According to Ravi Menon, executive director of the authority’s 
supervisory policy and banking departments, the mandatory audit firm rotation would help prevent audit firms from 
having excessive focus on maintaining long-term commercial relationships with the banks they audit. However, in 
Malaysia there is no regulation binding the banks or the companies to change the audit firms within a certain period.  
Since the auditor is an agent to the shareholders in monitoring managers’ duties to create wealth for the principals 
(shareholders), auditor’s failure to inform shareholders on the going concern of the principal’s business is a serious 
matter. With the introduction of the US Sarbanes Oxley, auditor’s relationship with the client is now being regulated to 
at least of the engagement audit partner’s tenure.  
In contrast, Petty and Cuganesan (1996) argued that when mandatory auditor rotation is regulated, clients might be 
forced to accept a lower quality of service from an auditor who is a generalist, especially if fewer auditors invest in 
specialized industries such as banking, insurance or natural resources. Moreover, Louwers (1998); Johnson, Khurana, 
and Reynolds (2002) found no evidence of reduced financial quality for longer audit firm’s tenures. Recently, Geiger 
and Raghunandan (2002) studied a sample of 117 bankrupt companies and suggested that auditors may be more 
influenced by their newly obtained clients in the earlier years of the engagement. In addition, Chi and Huang (2004) 
found that audit firm tenure helps to produce higher earnings quality due to familiarity effect, but excessive familiarity 
results in lower earnings quality. Furthermore, they found that audit firm tenure plays a key role in the transmission of 
learning experience. Thus, audit independence issue or audit competence issue is crucial and problematic in early years 
of engagement and not in later years. 
Overall, prior researches suggested that there should not be any fast rules on mandatory audit firm rotation. In United 
States, many auditors have served their clients for more than twenty years (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002) and some 
since listed in the stock exchange. In such cases, auditors would be under greater pressure from clients and thus would 
unlikely issue a going concern opinion. However, auditors may be argued to have in-depth knowledge and thus would 
be able to defend themselves if such difficult situation arises. In addition, they would be able to advise their clients if 
going concern assumption is no longer appropriate. Therefore, the derived hypothesis as follows (in alternate form): 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between audit firm tenure and the issuance of going concern 
opinion. 
3. Research method 
3.1 Sample and data 
The sample comprises all listed non-finance distressed companies identified using a list of financial indicators under 
ISA 570 (revised) Going Concern. The data is primarily from annual reports of public listed companies in Bursa 
Malaysia. The year of 2002 is selected since the ISA 570 (revised) came into force from 1 January 2002. We found 187 
companies, which fulfilled the distress characteristics.   
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3.2 Explanations of the Model 
This study replicates the model from the previous established studies in going concern audit opinion. (Louwers, 1998; 
Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002) 
The research model (in logistic form) is as follows: 
GC = Į + b1 TENURE + b2 BIGFIVE + b3 ACOM + b4 ZFC + b5 DFT + b6 LOGASSETS + e 
The measurements of the variables are as follows: 
Dependent Variable Measurement 
GC = 1 if auditor issued going-concern opinion, else 0 
Hypotheses Variables 
TENURE = Audit firm tenure in number of years  
3.3 Control variables measurement  
BIGFIVE = Dummy variable, 1 if the auditor is the Big Five firm, and else 0 
ACOM = Dummy variable, 1 if the audit committee is comprised of all non-executive directors, else 0 
ZFC = Probability of bankruptcy calculated from Zmijewski Financial Condition (1984) 
DFT = Dummy variable having a value of 1 if the company is in default, else 0 
LOGASSETS = Natural log of total assets of clients 
e = Error term of residual 
Į i = constant (i = 0) 
b = coefficients (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) 
3.4 Variables definition and discussion 
3.4.1 Tenure  
Tenure is the first hypothesis variable measured by the length of years which audit firms audit their clients (Louwers, 
1998; Vanstraelen, 2000). Similarly, we argue that auditors are in greater pressures from clients especially if the 
auditors have served the clients since the clients listed in the stock exchange for many years.  Due to the mixed 
theories and empirical findings, we do not provide direction for this relationship.  
3.4.2 Big Five 
DeAngelo (1981) theorized that larger audit firms have superior audit quality since they invest more in audit technology 
and training. Thus, in term of audit competence, it could be argued that larger audit firm would be more accurately able 
to detect problems related to going-concern assumption than smaller audit firms. In term of audit independence, larger 
audit firms have more spreads of clients’ base when auditing listed companies than smaller audit firms (Md. Yusof & 
Che Ahmad, 2000) and thus have less dependence on a particular client.  In addition, Palmrose (1988) found that the 
larger audit firms were less likely to be involved in audit-related litigation than the smaller one. Alternatively, Big Five 
firms have greater risk of losing reputation, which may motivate them to be more objectivity when making an audit 
reporting decision. Anandarajan et al. (2001) however, found no evidence of auditor size effect on auditor going 
concern reporting. Such finding warrant a further study, perhaps in Malaysia, since the public perceive differences exist 
in many aspects of auditing between larger firms and smaller firms including going concern assumption. In addition, 
this variable is never tested in Malaysia environment. (Md. Yusof, Md. Saleh & Abdul Hamid, 2002).    
3.4.3 Audit committees 
Audit committee has been made mandatory in Malaysia since 1993. (Note 1) It is more likely that interaction between 
audit committee with external auditors may influence auditor’s choice of issuing going-concern. (Note 2) An 
independent audit committee could help mitigate such pressure by supporting the auditor in disputes with management 
(Knapp, 1987). Hence, we expect some characteristics of board of directors, especially non-executive directors, as 
public watchdog and audit committee will influence auditor’s choice in going-concern.  Knapp (1987) found that in a 
major audit disputes, audit committee members tended to support the auditors rather than the management. Similarly, 
Md. Yusof and Che Ahmad (2000) found evidence that independent audit committee is associated with going concern 
opinion.  
We argue that placing strategic executive directors on the committee may shadow a measurement of independence of 
audit committee by proportion of outside directors. We believe a higher independence of audit committee, which is 
measured by non-existence of powerful directors especially the managing director and executive directors (Carcello & 
Neal, 2000) would lend better support for auditors. Thus, independent audit committees will ensure that the audit 
opinion really gives a picture the situation of that company. 
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3.4.4 Probability of bankruptcy 
Several studies found that a positively relationship between going concern opinion and probability of bankruptcy of a 
company. This is due to the fact that, the higher probability of bankruptcy, the higher the need of the auditors to issue 
going-concern opinion. Regardless of whatever bankruptcy model being employed in prior researches (Hopwood, 
McKeown & Mutchler, 1989; Vanstraelen, 2000) in going concern opinion, the results suggest that auditors do assess 
distress condition of their clients. Prior research in Malaysia by Md. Yusof et al. (2002) used Zmijewski Financial 
Condition (ZFC) that suggested by Zmijewski (1984) and they found significant result. Similarly, we employ ZFC to 
measure financial distress of the companies. Kleinman and Anandarajan (1999) suggested that a score, which exceed 
0.28, is considered as financial distress. Therefore, there is a positive association between probability of bankruptcy and 
going concern opinion. 
3.4.5 Default 
In this present study, a company is classified a default company if the company is either in payment default or technical 
default or has breached loan covenants. Therefore, we employ dichotomous variable as suggested by Chen and Church 
(1992). Going concern is associated with default status. This due to the fact that default status would send strong bad 
signal which potential and successful negotiation with banks or other creditors would be unlikely. In the absence of 
such supports, companies under financial distress would hardly stay as going-concern company in the future accounting 
period. Thus, there is a positive association between default status and of going-concern opinion. 
3.4.6 Client Size 
Total assets is used in the present study due to the amount of assets, that more consistent before and after the 1997 crisis 
compared to revenues. However, Md. Yusof et al. (2002) found no evidence that size of clients measured by total assets 
has association with the type of going concern audit report. Other measurements of client size include market 
capitalization and a mixture of sales and assets. This variable is transformed to logarithmic data to control for 
non-normality. Consistent with the previous research, a negative relationship between this independent variable and 
going concern opinion is expected. (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002)  
4. Results and discussions 
4.1 Descriptive results 
From 187 non-finance companies, Arthur Andersen (AA) and Ernst Young (EY) audited 42.17% of distressed 
companies. Since the merger between those firms in July 2002, almost half of these troubled companies lie with this 
new EY. All Big Five accounts 70.28% of the Bursa Malaysia troubled firms. This figure is comparable with their total 
shares of the Bursa Malaysia companies (Md. Yusof & Che Ahmad, 2000). 77.5% or 145 of these companies received 
going concern audit opinion. Thus many problems and critics would lie in the case of non-receiving going concern 
opinion. 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) figures are closed to unitary and thus conclude that multicollinearity poses minimal 
threat to further regression analysis. (Note 3) In addition, further inspection using the condition index proves prior VIF 
test. Besides, 
Going concern opinion has strong and significantly correlation with audit tenure (r = 0.229), default status (r = 0.647), 
outside audit committee (r = 0.154) and probability of bankruptcy (r = 0.171). In contrast, correlation analysis does not 
show any significant relationship between Big Five variable and going concern opinion variable. As mentioned above, 
univariate results should be read with caution and act as a complement to multivariate analysis of logistic regression.   
4.2 Multivariate regression 
The result does not support the frequent arguments of negative audit tenure effects made by public and business 
community. However, our finding reveals that if a client never changes its auditor since listed in stock exchange, then 
the possibility of receiving clean opinion is higher. These results support Chi and Huang (2004) who suggested that 
familiarity effect produce higher earnings quality, but excessive familiarity results in lower earnings quality (even the 
situation are difference between this study and Chi & Huang, 2004, similar proxy of audit firm tenure was used by both 
studies to examine the role of audit firm whether in going concern opinion or earning aspect).  
Moreover, there is evidence that audit firm size as surrogated by Big Five and non-Big Five dichotomous classifications 
have significant influence over auditor reporting decision. This is consistent with Behn, Kaplan and Krumwiede (2001). 
Thus, argument of perceived high quality by DeAngelo (1981) is apparent as generally supported in the case of audit 
fees research.  
However, audit committee independence variable is not significantly auditor going concern opinion. This may suggest 
that non-executive director variable should be replaced with independent director variable as a proxy of outside audit 
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committees due to the fact that independent director is more likely accurate in term of the whole outside audit 
committee without any relationships with the company.   
77.55% of the sample is companies, which have audit tenure of five years or more. In order to examine the robustness 
of the model and results, sensitivity analyses have been conducted.  The sensitivity analysis is done by first changing 
the measurement of TENURE to a dichotomous value of TENURE (coded as 1 if the tenure is seven years above and 
ten years above). Finally, by changing the measurement of TENURE to logarithm. Overall, it can be said that the 
general results in Table 4 still hold and robust.    
The call for mandatory audit rotation may not yield what it hopes for. We would say our results do not support audit 
firm rotation and thus change of auditor should be made for necessary and reasonable grounds such as in the event of 
non-performance of auditors or change of substantial and controlling shareholders and others. 
Our results are also consistent with Md. Yusof et al. (2002) that related to debt-default status and serious financial 
distress variable. Both variables are strong determinants of auditor’s decision in issuing going concern in Malaysia. 
These findings also contribute to high pseudo R2 but it is still comparable with prior researches (Geiger & Raghunandan, 
2002 had pseudo R2 0.33; Louwers, 1998 had pseudo R2 0.44). In addition, assets of the companies are proved to be 
insignificant factor whether in the main results or in the sensitivity analyses.  There are several explanations. First is 
the auditor may investigate the quality of the assets and not just “any assets”. It is quite possible, if the distressed 
company has significant portion of assets, which have higher market value and demand such as investment in listed 
shares or has properties of high value that would make the company more “survive” than others. Thus auditor may not 
issue a going concern opinion to such companies. Secondly, a better proxy for size in the case of going concern opinion 
such as revenue or turnover of the companies may yield better results. 
Interestingly, it seems that in Malaysia, auditors are skeptical or very conservative on going concern assumption made 
by directors and thus they made lower type II error compare to type I error. High type I error may lead to self-fulfilling 
theory which suggest that their clients may face difficulties in obtaining credit or financing facilities from bankers or 
investors. The auditors do take to the account these factors in their going concern opinion decision. Such events may 
cause higher cost to the auditors i.e. clients switch their auditors but Ismail (1998) found that going concern opinion 
alone would not precipitate such effect. Future research on value relevance of going concern audit opinion may unveil 
this effect.  
5. Conclusions 
Mandatory audit rotation debates came from the arguments that long audit tenure would create cozy relationship 
between auditors and clients and thus would lead to audit failure such as in the case of going concern opinion. We 
found no market wide evidence to support that argument in Malaysia but instead we found that longer audit tenure has 
positive significant association with auditor’s reporting decision. In addition, we found that auditors in Malaysia made 
less serious error (type II) or audit failure compared to our model. However, we did not test on other type of audit 
failure such as qualified opinion of non-going concern issues. In this study, we did not discriminate the different types 
of going concern opinion including modified opinion, qualified opinion or disclaimer opinion as stated in ISA 570 
(revised 2000). 
Our results also show that if a client never changes its auditor since listed in Bursa Malaysia, there is a tendency to issue 
a clean opinion though the client suffers apparent financial problems. Therefore, we echo the importance of 
self-regulation and Laissez-faire practice in Malaysia as a better alternative than a mandatory auditor rotation. Perhaps 
current national undertakings by regulators such as strengthening audit committee in term of independence and 
competence and peer audit review process by the MIA would inhibit unethical audit process in Malaysia. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Beginning 31 August 1993, companies seeking listing on Bursa Malaysia are required to have audit committee 
under s15A of Bursa Malaysia listing requirement.  
Note 2. Among main functions of audit committee are reviewing audit planning and audit procedures and discussing 
audit findings and report (MIA recommended practice guide on Audit Committee & section 344A Bursa Malaysia 
listing requirements). 
Note 3. VIF ranges from 1.0408 to 1.441. 
Note 4. Two assumptions of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are considered and corrected in the multivariate 
regression analysis. 
Table 1. Studies of audit tenure on auditor reporting 
Studies Measurement of audit 
tenure
Country Sample Audit tenure to 
auditor reporting 
Geiger and Raghunandan 
(2002)
Natural log of  
number of years 
U.S. 117 stressed & bankrupt 
companies 
Positive 
Anandarajan, La Salle and 
Anandarajan (2001) 
Dichotomous value, 1 
for audit tenure of 
three years or less & 0 
otherwise
U.S. Two partition of 216 for 
financial service & 307 
from non-financial 
service industry 
Negative 
Vanstraelen (2000) Number of years Belgium 146 match sample of 
stressed & non-stressed 
non-bankrupt companies 
Negative 
Louwers (1998) Number of years U.S. 808 stressed non-bankrupt 
companies 
Not significant 
Table 1 shows relevant studies on the audit tenure variable in relation to the auditors’ reporting. It can be said that, in 
empirically studies, the audit tenure variable is still new though debates on audit tenure have gone through times and 
tides for four decades. Results are inconclusive like many other researches in auditing. Thus prompting for a need of a 
new study in a new environment especially in new emerging markets like Malaysia.   
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Table 2. T-test of Big Five and Non-Big Five 
Variables Big Five (means) Non Big Five (means) t-value Sig. 
TENURE (in years) 10.5 7.26 2.820 0.005 
GOING CONCERN 0.82 0.70 1.863 0.064 
ACOM 0.33 0.26 0.910 0.364 
DFT 0.66 0.61 0.657 0.512 
ZFC 15.63 22.99 -0.805 0.422 
TOTAL ASSETS (RM) 679,922,418 471,684,583 0.767 0.444 
T-test in the Table 2 confirms this preliminary finding that Big Five is different than non Big Five in terms of audit 
opinion and tenure. Big Five generally have longer audit tenure and issued a slightly more going concern opinion than 
non-Big Five. However, this is only a univariate test-result, which needs to be interpreted with caution. Therefore, a 
model that combines multiple variables such as regression procedure would unveil whether such relationship holds true 
in a multivariate analysis.   
Table 3. Pearson’s correlation among independent variables
 TENURE BIGFIVE ACOM ZFC DFT LOGASSETS 
TENURE 1 .201(**) .122 -.033 .249(**) .085 
BIGFIVE .201(**) 1 .039 -.060 .043 .055 
ACOM .122 .039 1 .154(*) .114 .039 
ZFC -.033 -.060 .154(*) 1 .199(**) -.101 
DFT .249(**) .043 .114 .199(**) 1 -.055 
LOGASSETS .085 .055 .039 -.101 -.055 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 3 of Pearson’s correlation shows that multicollinearity is minimal. The results in Table 3, suggest that the largest 
absolute value is only 0.249 between TENURE and DFT with significant level at 0.01.  
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Table 4. Summary of logistic regression for going concern opinion, n = 187 
Notes: 
a.Dependent Variable: GC 
b.Predictors: TENURE, BIGFIVE, ACOM, ZFC, DFT, LOGASSETS, Constant.  
*** significant at 0.0001 level (2-tailed)
**     significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*       significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
Table 4 shows that audit firm tenure has statistically positive significant relationship (at-two-tailed) with the issuance of 
going concern opinion. (Note 4). The results are similar as Geiger and Raghunandan (2002). This means that the longer 
an audit firm audits a client the higher probability the auditor issuing going concern opinion. 
Table 5. Classification table for going concern opiniona
 Model’s predicted opinion 
Auditor’s actual opinion Standard Going concern Percentage correct 
Standard 32 9 78.0 
Going concern 12 134 91.8 
Overall percentage 37.5% 6.7% 88.8% 
a. The cut value is .500 
Table 5 shows minimal improvement in term of accuracy from Md. Yusof et al. (2002). The model has high prediction 
power of 88.8%. Type II (6.7%) is lower than type I (37.5%) error, which is deem not a serious problem. Type II error 
leads to auditors to give a clean opinion whereby they should give a going concern opinion. Thus we can say that most 
of distressed companies in Malaysia received “warning” from their auditor by issuing a going concern opinion. 
Variables Sign Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
t-ratio 
TENURE ? .9300516409E-02 
(.27108288E-02) 
3.431*** 
BIGFIVE + .1102186779 
(.59473496E-01) 
1.853* 
ACOM + .8920864604E-01 
(.51379021E-01) 
1.736* 
ZFC + .8595481481E-03 
(.35859263E-03) 
2.397** 
DFT + .1655871558 
(.94579344E-01) 
1.751* 
LOGASSETS - -.1827234697E-01 
(.39940892E-01) 
-.457 
Constant +/- .6116888266 
(.33447508) 
1.829* 
p-value .00000 
Cox & Snell R2 0.464 
Nagelkerke R2 0.714 
Correctly classified 88.8% 
Durbin-Watson 1.95250 
